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One part of the long pre-history surrounding the deployment of GPS-guided bombs began in the late 1960s with US Army Corps of Engineers and a research project to improve the accuracy of American field artillery. The Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (APPS) was a tool to calculate the coordinates of a target seen on reconnaissance photography. Introduced into service in the mid-1970, APPS and the geo-referenced imagery that it used (the Point Positioning Data Base, or PPDB) proved so useful that they were borrowed by US Air Force and Navy airstrike planners too.
The desire to fix targets from aerial photography and strike them with precision was hardly unique to APPS’s users. The Air Force also had a system for calculating target coordinates under development. The Photogrammetric Target System (PTS) was part of a far grander system for detecting, locating, and destroying enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites called the Precision Location and Strike System (PLSS). Unlike APPS, which printed out target coordinates for human use, the proposed PTS was a fully computerized system that would transmit the coordinates to PLSS’s central computer somewhere in West Germany or the United Kingdom, where they would be converted into guidance instructions for the 2,000-lb glide bombs that were going to be the sharp end of the system.
You can see how PTS’s fortunes waxed and waned by following the annual briefings on PLSS that the Air Force gave to Congress. What began in 1973 was gradually scaled back as PLSS’s own funding declined. Plans for a manual prototype PTS were cancelled when it became clear that APPS could do the same job, and the system disappeared from the briefing in 1980.
While the Air Force was experimenting with PTS and APPS to plan aerial attacks, PPDB was expanding in importance to become part of the targeting process for non-nuclear Tomahawk missiles being operated by the US Navy. Simultaneously, crises with Iran and the demands of the Carter Doctrine drove the expansion of PPDB coverage in the Middle East to 930,000 square nautical miles by 1981.
That meant that when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 the US had 100% PPDB coverage of the theater, better than the coverage with either 1:50,000 topographical maps or 1;250,000 Joint Operations Graphic-Air. Unfortunately, the PPDB imagery was woefully out of date, forcing the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) to make PPDB updates part of its vast cartographic build-up for Operation Desert Shield. That included 30 new PPDB sets (of 83 requested), 26 video PPDB sets, and 7,972 target coordinates.
Despite those deliveries, the obsolescence of PPDB imagery was noticed during Operation Desert Storm. The annual official history of 37th Fighter Wing – which flew the F-117 stealth fighter during Desert Storm – complained that:
Spot imagery was not of sufficient high resolution to support the technical requirements of a high technology system such as the F-117A Stealth Fighter. And, the available Analytical Photogrammetric Positioning System (APPS) Point Positioning Data Base (PPDB) was grossly outdated. It was not until the last week of the war that more current PPDBs arrived, which was too late to have an effect on combat operations.
After 1991, the need for precise target coordinates grew alongside the spread of precision guided weapons that needed those coordinates, which meant that what had begun as an Army instrument became more and more vital to aviation. A 1994 naval aviation handbook reminded users that “reliable target coordinates come only from a limited number of classified sources,” including the Defense Mapping Agency’s “Points Program” (which accepted requests by phone or secure fax) and APPS systems carried on aircraft carriers.
Unlike laser or electro-optical-guided bombs that homed in on a signature that their target emitted or reflected, bombs and missiles guided by GPS simply fly or fall towards the coordinates they are given. Widespread deployment during the bombing of Serbia in 1999 (Operation ALLIED FORCE) therefore meant a vast demand for precise target coordinates.
The Point Positioning Data Base, now provided in digital form rather than as a film chip/magnetic cassette combination, was an important source of those coordinates because it provided not just two-dimension latitude/longitude coordinates but also elevation. In a desert environment like Iraq, a bomb dropped from above could more or less be assumed to hit its target no matter how large the gap between the actual elevation of the ground. Where the terrain was more varied, however, aiming to high or too low could cause the bomb to slam into a hill short of the target or fly right over it and land long. Securing that elevation information from aerial photography was known as “mensuration.”
Though APPS was a computerized tool, it used film chips rather than digital imagery. To take the entire system digital, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (which had absorbed the Defense Mapping Agency in 1996) developed a computer workstation called DEWDROP that could provide mensurated coordinates using the Point Positioning Data Base. That was followed a few years later by a similar system called RainDrop. In February 1999, a little over a month before ALLIED FORCE began, the Air Force committed to buy 170 RainDrop systems for $1.8 million from Computek Research, Inc. (Here’s the press release.)
During ALLIED FORCE, mensurated coordinates were needed for Tomahawk, CALCM, and SLAM missiles, as well as the JDAM bombs being carried by the first B-2 stealth bombers. To get them, the air operations center in Vincenza, Italy had to reach back to analysts in the United States, which was where the mensuration workstations were located. Here’s how Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Jr. describes the process of acquiring them, starting from a rough fix provided by an ELINT satellite:
So I walked into the intelligence center and sitting there was a 22-year-old intelligence specialist who was talking to Beale Air Force Base via secure telephone and Beale Air Force Base was driving a U–2 over the top of this spot. The U–2 snapped the picture, fed it back to Beale Air Force base where that young sergeant to my young petty officer said, we have got it, we have confirmation. I called Admiral Ellis, he called General Clark, and about 15 minutes later we had three Tomahawk missiles en route and we destroyed those three radars.
ALLIED FORCE was confirmation for many observers that coordinate-guided weapons were the wave of the future. Tools like PPDB were necessary infrastructure for that transformation.
Forward to Part Three